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The United States Marine Corps praises Operation Dewey Canyon, which occurred from 22 
January-18 March 1969, as one of their most successful operations during the Vietnam War. This 
paper examines the planning of Operation Dewey Canyon and provides a narrative of the action 
with emphasis on the use of supporting arms. I use Operation Dewey Canyon as a case study to 
comment on historiographical debates about strategy during the Vietnam War. Some historians, 
most notably Lewis Sorley, have argued “a better war” after the Tet Offensive. Sorley argues 
that General Creighton Abrams shifted American strategy from search-and-destroy operations to 
pacification-centric operations with limited use of firepower. This study of Operation Dewey 
Canyon lends support to the arguments of Gregory Daddis and Andrew Birtle who maintain that 
this shift never occurred. I also argue that Operation Dewey Canyon was not as tactically 
innovative or successful as claimed by the Marine Corps and historians such as Allan R. Millett. 
In order to conduct this study, I examine After-Action reports at the battalion and regimental 
level, interviews with officers, the artillery report for Dewey Canyon, and command 
chronologies. These sources suggest a continuity of tactics and use of firepower (artillery and 
Close Air Support) between the strategies of General William C. Westmoreland and Abrams, 
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Operation Dewey Canyon, conducted from 22 January to 18 March 1969, was the high-
water mark of Marine Corps action in the Vietnam War and the operation is still praised for its 
tactical innovation.1 The Marine Corps regards Dewey Canyon so highly that it is included as a 
case study within its educational curriculum. The lessons taught by the Marine Corps emphasize 
Dewey Canyon’s tactical innovation, planning, and use of supporting arms and services.2 This 
article argues that Dewey Canyon was not as tactically innovative or as successful as the Marine 
Corps has claimed and taught. The lessons gleaned from Dewey Canyon by the Marine Corps are 
based on a skewed interpretation of the operation. Rather, this article emphasizes that the tactics 
utilized were merely an adaptation of army air assault and firebase techniques into the Marines’ 
tactical repertoire.  
Poor intelligence of the enemy presence in the area of operations (AO) plagued the 
Marines throughout the action. In addition, the logistics of the operation proved haphazard due to 
poor intelligence on weather conditions and the lack of helicopter resources for resupply. Dewey 
Canyon was not a triumph of logistic adaptation as claimed by the Marine Corps. Nor was it an 
                                                          
1 After Action Report, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines [hereafter, AAR 1/9], 46-47, in Jim Ginther Collection, Texas Tech 
Vietnam Virtual Archive, Lubbock, TX [hereafter, TTVA]; Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History of the 
United States Marine Corps, rev. and exp. ed. (New York: Free Press, 1991), 595; Charles R. Smith U.S. Marines in 
Vietnam: High Mobility and Standdown, 1969 (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division Headquarters, 
1988), 50-51. Charles Melson, “Dewey Canyon: Thirty Years Later,” Fortitudine 28, no. 2, (1999); Dick Camp, 
“Operation Dewey Canyon: The Heroic Saga of Company G,” Leatherneck 98, no. 8 (August 2015): 36 Advanced 
Technologies & Aerospace Database [hereafter, ATAD]; Gordon M. Davis, “Dewey Canyon: All Weather Classic,” 
Marine Corps Gazette 53, no. 7 (July 1969) ATAD; Allan C. Bevilacqua, “Operation Dewey Canyon: Cleaning Up 
the A Shau Valley,” Leatherneck 97, no. 4 (April 2014) ATAD. 
2 Battle Studies: Dewey Canyon, Amphibious Warfare School Education Center [hereafter AWSEC], Marine Corps 
Development & Education Command, Academic Year AWC-1986, Marine Corps History Division Archives, 
Quantico, VA [hereafter, MCHDA]; Battle Studies: Dewey Canyon, AWSEC, Marine Corps Development 
Command, Academic Year AWC-1988, MCHDA; Combat Leadership Symposium “Dewey Canyon” Selected 
Readings and Advance Sheet, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, AY 1993-1994, MCHDA; Notes from 






example of a conscious choice to limit logistic capabilities for enhanced versatility.3 The 
operation also did not inflict sufficient damage to the North Vietnamese because the Marines 
abandoned the area, necessitating American forces to return in the summer of 1969.  
Furthermore, the operation’s tactics and use of firepower suggests a continuity of strategy 
between the command eras of generals William C. Westmoreland (1964-1968) and Creighton W. 
Abrams (1968-1972). This raises questions about the viability of Lewis Sorley’s “Better War” 
thesis. Sorley posits that Abrams employed a strategy that emphasized pacification over 
conventional operations, including more ‘focused’ use of firepower, characterized by less use of 
artillery, observed and unobserved, and air strikes in general, especially in populated areas.4 
Other scholars, such as John Nagl and Guenter Lewy, assert that Abrams wanted a shift to 
pacification-centric strategy, but army organizational culture remained determined to fight a 
conventional war of attrition.5 
Recently, historians Gregory Daddis and Andrew Birtle notably challenged the ‘better 
war’ thesis. Daddis argues that Creighton Abrams’ strategy did not and could not salvage the 
conflict after 1968 and that his strategy was not a radical departure from Westmoreland’s. 
Daddis maintains that Abrams’ ‘one war’ concept represented more a change in rhetoric than a 
modification of strategy in practice. Additionally, Birtle demonstrated that Abrams’ policies and 
strategy were rooted in Westmoreland’s approach.6 This article intends to lend reinforcement to 
Daddis and Birtle’s conclusions by using Operation Dewey Canyon as a case study. Dewey 
                                                          
3 Battle Studies: Dewey Canyon, AWC-1986, 14.  
4 Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last  
Years in Vietnam (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1999), xiii, 219-21. 
5 John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Guenter Lewy, 
America in Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 137-38. 
6 Gregory Daddis, Withdrawal: Reassessing America’s Final Years in Vietnam (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2017), 9, 19; Andrew Birtle, “PROVN, Westmoreland, and the Historians, an Appraisal,” Journal for Military 





Canyon was a search-and-destroy operation that did not show any characteristics of a new 
approach. Supporting arms, especially artillery, remained the primary tool for generating enemy 




















In early 1968, the 3rd Marine Division was stationed on the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) 
in Quang Tri Province tasked with improving the strongpoint defense of the McNamara Line 
along the border with North Vietnam.7 The 3rd was a part of III Marine Amphibious Force 
(MAF), and had just been involved in very heavy fighting during the Tet Offensive with places 
like Khe Sanh and Hue City becoming familiar names.  On 22 May, Major General Raymond G. 
Davis assumed command of the 3rd Marine division and announced a new operational method 
he termed “high mobility.”8 Instead of what he dismissed as the mistaken policy of static defense 
on the McNamara Line, Davis advocated for aggressive sweeps using helicopters, firepower, and 
saturation of the AO.9 These ideas, however, were neither new nor radical. His senior officers 
had essentially frozen construction on the McNamara Line on 20 January.10 Moreover, Davis’s 
views on high mobility mirrored the operations the army had been conducting since 1965, 
involving sweeps dependent upon air mobility via helicopters, while searching for enemy troops 
and equipment to destroy.11 
                                                          
7 Jack Shulimson, Leonard A. Blasiol, and David A. Dawson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Defining Year, 1968, 
(Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1997), 29. The McNamara 
Line was a static defensive position implemented at the request of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to 
prevent North Vietnamese infiltration and invasion across the DMZ in the northern portion of Quang Tri Province in 
South Vietnam.  
8 Raymond Gilbert Davis was born in Fitzgerald, Georgia in 1915. He attended the Georgia Institute of Technology, 
graduating with a degree in Chemical Engineering in 1938. Soon after, he resigned his commission in the U.S. Army 
Reserve for one as a Second Lieutenant in the Marine Corps. He served in the Pacific theater during World War II, 
notably on Guadalcanal and Peleliu. He also participated in the breakout at Chosin Reservoir, winning the Medal of 
Honor and two Silver Stars. Davis was deputy commanding general for Provisional Corps, an Army Corps level 
organization under the command of III MAF, from March to May 1968. He succeeded Major General Rathvon M. 
Tompkins as 3rd Marine Division commander.  
9 Ray G. Davis with Bill Davis, “Protector of Freedom: The Story of Ray Davis, M.O.H. Lessons Learned in 
Combat and Life,” MS, 1990, MCHDA. 
10 Shulimson, Defining Year, 31.  
11 General Robert H. Barrow Interview Transcript, 266, Interviewed by Edwin H. Simmons, 27 January 1986, Oral 






Davis’s new approach prescribed several changes to the way 3rd Marine Division 
operated. First, Davis directed that each forward position, which had previously been occupied 
by a battalion, would instead be manned by one company with the other three companies of the 
battalion searching for the enemy beyond the wire. Second, Davis later claimed he ended the 
practice of loaning out battalions or companies to other units. Upon his arrival, he described his 
regiments as only having half of their battalions while the rest were dispersed around Da Nang.12 
The last piece of Davis’ reforms was the creation of a more mobile division, which the new 
generation of CH-46 helicopters made possible. The ‘Sea Knight’ had greater lift power and was 
better suited to the mobile warfare Davis wanted to wage. Operation Dewey Canyon would 
prove, however, that Davis relied too heavily on helicopter support that was just not available.  
Once all of these factors came to fruition Davis remarked, “Soon we were knocking the 
tops off little mountain peaks, putting our forces up there to move down against the enemy.”13  
Never shy about self-promotion, Davis maintained his new approach was innovative and allowed 
the Marines to aggressively seek the North Vietnamese. If the static defense was designed to 
have the NVA attack American positions, then Davis seemed prepared to throw his Marines at 
the enemy, while using firepower to minimize casualties. 
In addition, Davis stressed the usefulness of the firebase concept to 3rd Marine Division 
operations in I Corps.14 It is important to note that this concept did not originate with Davis or 
the Marine Corps. It was actually an army concept that the Marine Corps adopted and 
employed.15 This seriously injures the Marine Corps’ contention that the operation was tactically 
                                                          
12 Davis, “Protector of Freedom.”  
13 Ibid. 
14 This article will use the terms firebase and fire support base (FSB) in accordance with the Marines. It is also worth 
noting that the firebase concept consisted of the construction of multiple fire support bases.  





innovative in the broader context of the war. It also indicates continuity in strategy between 
Westmoreland era operations and those during the age of Abrams.  
Utilization of the firebase concept required intense planning and vast resources, notably 
helicopters. Prior to construction, the artillery unit’s commander informed the engineer about the 
gun requirements and placements, and the infantry officer informed their unit’s engineers of the 
operations that would take place in the vicinity of the firebase. After the planning phase, the 
landing zones (LZs) were established for helicopter lifts. Before any clearing happened atop the 
mountain or ridge, artillery applied preparation fire to the area to ensure there was no hostile 
resistance and to aid in the clearing process. Afterwards, engineers and infantrymen cleared 
foliage from atop the mountain; often the peak was blown off in order to provide a flat surface 
for the artillery to sit upon. Engineers then created the gun and ammunition pits for these artillery 
pieces with explosives. Once the clearing process was completed, helicopters delivered the 
artillery pieces to the hill.16 A firebase typically held six 105mm guns at minimum. The guns 
were arranged in a star pattern with the sixth placed in the center of the formation.17 This process 
was repeated over and over again to ensure that the Marines had adequate firepower, the ultimate 
producer of enemy casualties, wherever and whenever they operated. In the end, this process 
allowed for Davis’ conception of highly mobile operations to come to fruition without foregoing 
the advantage of fire support.  
At the time Davis took command, the 3rd sought the annihilation of the 320th North 
Vietnamese Army (NVA) Division in the area of Dong Ha. Until early June, the 3rd Marine 
                                                          
16 Robert V. Nicoli, “Fire Support Base Development,” in The Marines in Vietnam, 1954-1975: An Anthology and 
Annotated Bibliography, ed. Edwin H. Simmons (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division Headquarters, 
U.S. Marine Corps), 39-43. 





Division fought to eliminate the 320th and quell the offensives resulting from mini-Tet, a smaller 
scale offensive launched after the notorious Tet Offensive. During this period of operation, 
Davis’ reforms accumulated high praise from other Marines such as Captain Matthew G. 
McTiernan, commanding officer of Company I, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines who stated that “the 
decisive change in tactics initiated by General Davis’ was the most important factor in the defeat 
of the North Vietnamese offensive.”18 The Marines of the 3rd Division embraced Davis’ reforms 
because it removed them from their static positions, giving the appearance of progress.  
On 19 June, 3rd Marine Division was tasked with evacuating and razing Khe Sanh 
Combat Base. Operation Charlie required the removal of all supplies and destruction of all 
fortifications at the base. The operation ended on 5 July with the closing of Khe Sanh.  
From June to December 1968, the 3rd Marine Division conducted Operations Thor, 
Lancaster II, and Napoleon/Saline with Davis’ new approach.19 Operation Thor from 1-8 July 
was a search-and-destroy mission that yielded no great results, but utilized Davis’ concepts of 
high mobility and firebases. Lancaster II began prior to Davis’ command but during his tenure, 
from June until November, elements of the 3rd Marine Division conducted a search-and-destroy 
operation around the area known as the Rockpile, claiming to have killed 1,800 North 
Vietnamese. Ending in December 1968, Operation Napoleon/Saline mirrored Thor and Lancaster 
II once Davis took command. The Marines sought the destruction of the North Vietnamese and 
applied overwhelming firepower to do so.  
In mid-January 1969, Davis desired to issue a significant blow to the North Vietnamese 
forces in the Da Krong Valley, the formal name for the Dewey Canyon AO. The valley was the 
                                                          
18 Shulimson, Defining Year, 311.   





northern approach to the infamous A Shau Valley which funneled all the way to the crucial 
coastal cities of Hue and Da Nang. The terrain in the area was rugged with vegetation ranging 
from head-high elephant grass to triple-canopy jungle. The area contained two razorback 
ridgelines that ran north and south that the 9th Marines later swept down during the operation, 
hunting for the North Vietnamese and their equipment. The area was also mountainous with rises 
in elevation from 200 to 1,200 meters. Though no significant rainfall was predicted for the 
operation, a light drizzle with occasional downpours continued throughout the operation. The 
failure of the planners of Dewey Canyon to carefully consider the unpredictability of the weather 
proved crucial. Resupply, fire support, and reinforcement were severely affected by the weather 
from start to finish.20   
Though intelligence proved scarce, Davis seemed to believe that there was a large North 
Vietnamese conventional threat in the Da Krong Valley to warrant a mission designed to scour 
the jungle in search of soldiers and equipment to destroy. The enemy presence in the area, 
however, was described as “obscure,” meaning that they did not have a clear picture of what 
enemy units were in the area and how many troops there were.21 Aerial observation provided the 
only concrete intelligence the division and 9th Marines had on the area. Aircraft reported heavy 
anti-aircraft (AA) fire over the area and increased traffic on Route 548/922 from Laos into the 
Dewey Canyon AO. The area was reportedly an enemy logistics and administrative base area 
and an infiltration route for troops from Laos. Lastly, there was information supporting the 
presence of a major engineering effort near Tiger Mountain.22  
                                                          
20 Colonel Robert H. Barrow, “Operation Order 2-69 (Operation Dawson River South),” 14 January 1969 4/9, B-1, 
MCHDA; Melson, “Dewey Canyon,” 5.  






 Initially conceived under the name Operation Dawson River South, Davis and his staff 
planned Dewey Canyon in five days, a rather quick conception considering the length of the 
operation, but not out of the ordinary for the Vietnam War. The quick planning of such a large 
operation most likely contributed to the scarcity of intelligence and the logistic problems 
encountered throughout the operation. Davis selected the 9th Marine Regiment to conduct the 
main thrust of the operation. The 9th Marines were one of four regiments under the command of 
the 3rd Marine Division.23 The other regiments included the 3rd, 4th, and 26th Marines. Each 
regiment consisted of three combat battalions and a headquarters battalion. Each combat 
battalion consisted of almost 1,200 Marines, while the headquarters consisted of around 220 
Marines.24  The 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines (2/12) provided artillery support for 9th Marines, 
with batteries D, E, F, and mortar. Batteries D, E, and F consisted of six 105mm guns, while 
mortar battery consisted of six 107mm mortars. Additionally, the army loaned 1st and 3rd 
Provisional Howitzer Batteries with four 155mm guns each. For aviation, 1st Marine Air Wing 
provided helicopter and close air support, while the 7th Air Force supplied minimal tactical air 
support. Late in the operation, 2nd battalion, 3rd Marines assisted 9th Marines with firebase 
security. As a supplement to the operation, the 2nd Regiment of the Army of the Republic of 
Vietnam (ARVN) conducted operations in the vicinity of Fire Support Base (FSB) Davis and 
                                                          
23 All Marine regiments, 9th Marines included, at the time consisted of three battalions designated the 1st, 2nd, and 
3rd. Each battalion had four rifle companies and one Headquarter and Service company (H&S). The 1st battalion 
contained companies A (Alpha), B (Bravo), C (Charlie), and D (Delta). The 2nd battalion consisted of companies E 
(Echo), F (Fox), G (Golf), and H (Hotel). While 3rd battalion was composed of companies I (India), K (Kilo), L 
(Lima), and M (Mike). H&S company provided a myriad of support functions such as medical, supply, 
communications, and organic fire support in the form of mortars.  
24 Smith, High Mobility and Standdown, 381. At the beginning of 1969, 9th Marines consisted of 3,727 Marines. 1st 
Battalion had 1,162 Marines, 2nd Battalion counted 1,171, 3rd Battalion numbered 1,174, while Headquarters 






Hill 1108, northeast of the 9th Marines AO and the 101st Airborne Division operated directly to 
the east of 9th Marines.25 
Colonel Robert H. Barrow, commander of the 9th Marines issued Operation Order 2-69 
on 20 January 1969, two days before the operation actually commenced. The order planned four 
phases of operations. Phase I consisted of departure from FSB Henderson and the establishment 
FSBs Tun Tavern and Shiloh on days one and two of the operation.26 Phase II consisted of an 
infantry battalion assault along with construction and occupation of a firebase in the eight-
kilometer range of Shiloh, the maximum range of the 105mm howitzers atop the firebases was 
ten to eleven-kilometers. Eight kilometers allowed for the artillery to have a cushion of sorts 
when firing over engaged Marines. Phase III called for another infantry battalion assault in 
addition to the establishment of another firebase in the pre-existing eight-kilometer range of 
another base. It also required the displacement of the Regimental Command Post with its units 
and the artillery battalion headquarters (HQ). The original operation order called for a Phase IV 
requiring another infantry battalion assault, the creation of a new firebase and the extension of 
artillery coverage, but it was cancelled following the perceived success of Phase III. The 
coordinating instructions mandated infantry units to always operate within the eight-kilometer 
range of the various firebases to ensure the Marines were never outmatched.  
Broadly defined, the mission was: “On order the 9th Marines (Rein) commences 
offensive operations in the southern DA KRONG VALLEY area in order to kill, capture and 
destroy the enemy, his supplies and facilities.”27 The capture of equipment is often emphasized 
during assessments of Dewey Canyon, but “kill, capture and destroy the enemy” appear in the 
                                                          
25Barrow, “Operation Order 2-69,” 1. 
26 Ibid. 





statement of purpose before mentions of the destruction of enemy equipment or facilities. The 
mission statement above seems identical to the purpose of operations pre-Tet under 
Westmoreland’s command. These operations sought to find, fix, and kill the North Vietnamese 




















                                                          
28 3rd Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division, “Operations Order 1-66” (Operation Masher) Jan. 1966, 1-2, TTVA; 3rd 






Phase I required the reestablishment of firebases previously occupied by the Marines. 
These firebases provided artillery cover for the construction of new firebases in Phase II. Thus, 
on 17 January, FSB Henderson reopened and battery F/2/12 occupied the firebase.29 Three days 
later, two companies reopened FSB Tun Tavern. The next day, 21 January, Marine air provided 
preparatory fire for Shiloh and A/1/9 reoccupied the position with battery E/2/12.30 
Establishment of these firebases allowed the Marines to move on to Phase II. 
Phase II of the operation began on 22 January, with 2/9’s establishment of FSB Razor 
and the securing of LZ Dallas. Clearing the land for Razor proved more demanding than 
planned, according to Captain David F. Winecoff, “We went in with enough power saws and 
axes to do the job if we had the experienced people to work these things. But I found out that 
there are very few people in Hotel Company, and we were the ax swingers, that knew how to 
swing an ax properly, and we immediately proceeded to bust about 50 to 60 percent of our 
axes…”31 Nevertheless, the trees were cleared by the Marines with the help of bulldozers that 
were eventually brought in by helicopters, suggesting that the necessary equipment to clear the 
firebase sites was not available even at the beginning of the operation.  
                                                          
29 Gordon M. Davis’ article “Dewey Canyon: All Weather Classic” contradicts the After-Action Report stating that 
FSB Henderson was reopened on 19 January; Artillery Report of Operation Dewey Canyon, 2nd Battalion, 12th 
Marines, 5, MCHDA 18 June 1969. F/2/12 indicates that the unit was Battery F of the 2nd Battalion of the 12th 
Marine Regiment. This abbreviation style will used throughout the paper to indicate unit affiliation. Infantry 
companies will also be designated this way. For example, A/1/9 indicates Company A, 1st Battalion, 9th Marine 
Regiment.  
30 AAR 1/9, TTVA, 12; Command Chronology [hereafter, CC], January 1969, 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines, 6, 
MCHDA; Colonel Robert H. Barrow Interview, Interviewed by Willis S. Bernard, 8 April 1969, OHC, MCHDA.  
Smith, High Mobility and Standdown, 30. During this period, the operation was re-designated Operation Dewey 
Canyon from the previous Dawson River South.  
31 AAR 1/9, 12; After Action Report, 9th Marine Regiment [hereafter, AAR 9th Marines], 12, MCHDA; Smith, 






Razor’s construction continued into 23 January. Second Battalion also began patrolling 
around the site, while F/2/12’s 105mm howitzers displaced to Razor. The following day at 1700, 
the Command Post for the 9th Marines flew from Vandegrift Combat Base (VCB) to Razor 
while 3rd Battalion assaulted the location for Cunningham some 6,500 yards ahead of Razor. In 
addition, 2/12’s command and fire control groups also moved to Razor.32  
At 0935 on 25 January, 3/9 along with battery D/2/12 and mortar battery left VCB and 
lifted to Cunningham which officially opened later in the day. For the next three days, until 28 
January, the 9th Marines began patrolling around the firebases, making sporadic contact that 
proved inconclusive: only one North Vietnamese killed while two Marines were killed and two 
wounded. The 1st and 3rd Provisional Batteries lifted to Cunningham, increasing the amount of 
available artillery firepower.33 Additional artillery support allowed for Operation Dewey Canyon 
to build momentum for the Phase II objectives.  
A week into Phase II, artillery and airstrikes began to show their value and provide the 
first major successes for the Marines. The most significant development was a count of eighteen 
North Vietnamese killed by artillery and sixteen by airstrikes on 29 January. 34 The sudden 
contributions of artillery demonstrated how central the firebase concept was to the operation, but 
also raises questions about the nature of the fire missions. The After-Action Reports for the 
operation do not indicate that any weapons were found with the bodies. This suggests the 
possibility that the casualty numbers were a rough estimate by an observer who did not have a 
clear view of the carnage. Alternatively, the numbers could be an estimation of North 
                                                          
32 AAR 1/9, 12; AAR 9th Marines, 12; CC 2/12, 6; Smith, High Mobility and Standdown, 31; Barrow Interview, 
1969; Melson, “Dewey Canyon,” 5; Camp, “Operation Dewey Canyon,” 36.  
33 AAR 1/9, 12; AAR 9th Marines, 12; Melson, “Dewey Canyon,” 6; Smith, High Mobility and Standdown, 31. 





Vietnamese dead for unobserved Harassment and Interdiction (H&I) fire missions throughout the 
day, or that the bodies were civilians, possibly Montagnards.    
On 31 January, A/1/9 at Shiloh received their first detainees, five Montagnards that 
turned themselves over to American forces, indicating a possible unacknowledged civilian 
presence in the area. The most significant action of the day, however, was the commencement of 
the attack on Co Ka Leuye (Hill 1175) by company G/2/9 led by Captain Daniel A. Hitzelberger. 
The Marines lifted off from LZ Dallas, landing near Hill 1175. After crossing a tributary of the 
Da Krong, the company came upon the cliffs. Upon seeing the height of the cliffs Hitzelberger 
remarked to himself, “You’ve got to be joking.” While Hitzelberger tried to comprehend the 
scale of his task, the unit received sniper fire with a round narrowly missing him. The unit 
eventually climbed 500 feet of Co Ka Leuye’s slopes before making camp.35 Hitzelberger’s 
reaction to the heights and the overall objective of the action suggest problems with Marine 
Corps intelligence. The company commander seemed to be surprised by the heights. Likely 
because intelligence had not given him a sufficient picture of the terrain that lay ahead, a 
demonstration of the scarcity of information during the planning process. Additionally, the only 
reason G/2/9 was operating in the area was to search-and-destroy the enemy while securing the 
heights, a task neither new nor innovative.  
Company G continued their climb of Co Ka Leuye the next morning, climbing the sheer 
faced cliffs while the weather gradually worsened. The rain pounded the Marines as they 
climbed, alternating between heavy and drizzling rain interspersed with periods of dense fog. 
Eventually, Hitzelberger and his men achieved the objective, but the bad weather had set in. As a 
                                                          
35 Smith, High Mobility and Standdown, 34; AAR 1/9, 14; AAR 9th Marines, 13; Camp, “Operation Dewey 






result, Barrow became concerned about the viability of his units’ positions going forward.36 
Meanwhile, the other objectives for Phase II were achieved. F/2/9 gained control of the territory 
for FSB Erskine, but the weather prevented continued construction of the fire base. Four 
kilometers to the east of FSB Cunningham, K/3/9 commenced construction on FSB Lightning, 
but its completion was also stalled by the weather.37  
 Dense fog and rain still presided over the region on the morning of 3 February, forcing 
Barrow to make a decision: keep his units in the field or order them to retreat and set up 
defensive positions near a firebase. The weather had halted the possibility of resupply to forward 
deployed units such as Hitzelberger’s G Company at Co Ka Leuye. In addition, no medical 
evacuations could be carried out anywhere in the AO. Therefore, on 4 February, Barrow ordered 
the 2nd and 3rd Battalions to move to areas easily resupplied and for all units to set up defensive 
positions. Both battalions moved back towards Razor and Cunningham. The only issue was 
artillery ammunition. The lack of heavy lift helicopters for resupply ruined plans to compile a 
5,000 artillery round reserve, highlighting a recurring issue with logistics that continued 
throughout the operation. Over the next ten days, they fired only 6,078 rounds with their only 
confirmed kills being six North Vietnamese.38 Additionally, the lack of helicopters for resupply 
presents a reoccurring problematic aspect of Davis’ adoption of airmobile tactics and the firebase 
concept. The Marine Corps still did not have enough helicopters to be fully airmobile when 
operating in remote locations such as the Da Krong Valley. Davis, in his attempts to bring a 
                                                          
36 AAR 1/9, 14; AAR 9th Marines, 14; Camp, “Operation Dewey Canyon,” 54. 
37 Smith, High Mobility and Standdown, 34; Davis, “Dewey Canyon,” 36-37.  
38 AAR 1/9, 14; AAR 9th Marines, 14; Barrow Interview, 1969; Smith, High Mobility and Standdown, 35; Camp, 





‘new’ strategy to the 3rd Marine Division, put his Marines in a tactical situation where they 
could not be sustained.  
In response to the harsh weather, L/3/9 took position at FSB Cunningham. Companies I, 
K, and M set up nearby Cunningham. Company H resided at FSB Razor. F settled at FSB 
Erskine, and company E defended LZ Dallas. The only company left in the field was 
Hitzelberger’s G/2/9. They remained in position on 4 February atop Co Ka Leuye whilst making 
contact with twenty North Vietnamese at 0930, killing three. They were hit again at 1045 and 
1240 suffered one wounded and killed four North Vietnamese. Despite the inclement weather 
that prevented resupply, American aircraft continued to provide support, reporting two North 
Vietnamese killed. Early in the morning on 5 February, G/2/9 finally began to pull back to a 
more practical position as ordered.  
After several hours of descending from Co Ka Leuye, fifteen North Vietnamese 
ambushed the company.39 Enemy soldiers embedded in low lying bunkers, and among rocks and 
brush, raked the point fire team with small arms fire, pinning them down. Hitzelberger brought 
up the rest of his 3rd Platoon, whose men composed the point fire team, and sent 2nd Platoon to 
sweep through the enemy position, but small arms and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) halted 
their advance. With his platoons halted, Hitzelberger made the decision to commit his 1st 
Platoon by swinging them even further left through a ravine to hit the enemy flank, allowing the 
3rd Platoon to advance, leading to an enemy withdrawal.40 G/2/9 suffered significant casualties 
with five Marines killed and seventeen wounded with only two North Vietnamese dead. The lack 
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of supporting arms proved deadly for the Marines.41 This particular action was one of several 
engagements that defies the narrative of Dewey Canyon as an overwhelming American victory. 
The lack of intelligence and ability to deliver supporting arms proved deadly for the men of 
G/2/9. 
Following the ambush, G/2/9, after moving slowly all day finally set up camp at 0200 on 
the morning of 6 February. Later, as the company moved toward their rendezvous point, they 
were able to utilize artillery once again. Hitzelberger ordered his forward observer to set artillery 
concentrations along their route 100 to 150 meters behind their rear security squad in order to 
prevent enemy pursuit.42 Late on the evening of 6 February, the men of G/2/9 scaled the same 
sheer cliffs they had conquered on 1 February, linking up with E/2/9 at its base and received 
medical supplies and rations for the first time in three days. The two companies then embarked 
on their journey back toward the Da Krong River and LZ Dallas. 43 
 G/2/9 arrived at LZ Dallas on the morning of 8 February battered and bruised but 
seemingly in good spirits.44  The same day, the North Vietnamese pounded the American 
positions with artillery, particularly 3/9 near FSB Cunningham. The battalion received 122mm 
artillery fire throughout the day resulting in seven wounded Marines.45 Phase II proved less than 
decisive for the Marines, killing forty-nine NVA soldiers, not counting artillery and air 
contributions, while sustaining sixteen Marines killed and fifty-eight wounded. The North 
Vietnamese had maintained the initiative throughout the period and pounded Marine positions 
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with artillery. Though the Marines were not prevented from achieving their objectives, the costs 
were fairly high for the simple task of clearing an area where no substantial enemy presence was 
suspected. Artillery and air support provided the highest individual body counts during Phase II, 
accounting for forty-five additional deaths despite being severely limited by weather conditions 
and ammunition shortages. This means that despite being rendered ineffective for a large portion 
of the operational phase, artillery and air support still almost matched the results of Marine 
riflemen. In fact, when Marine riflemen and North Vietnamese troops were pitted directly 
against each other, the results were not overwhelmingly in favor of the Marines. The Americans 
suffered less personnel killed, but suffered a significant amount of wounded.  
Between 9-11 February, the weather began to lighten and the Marines gradually 
increased their activity.46 FSB Erskine was finally opened by Battery F/2/12. Phase II effectively 
ended on 10 February. The alignment of all the battalions side by side in a straight-line line 
meant the units were ready for their sweep in force south toward the A Shau Valley. The days of 
small sporadic combat were over. The heaviest resistance of the operation lay ahead. The true 
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The 3rd Battalion crossed Phase Line Red in the early morning on 11 February, and 
immediately made contact with North Vietnamese soldiers. North Vietnamese and American 
artillery fire picked up significantly. 3/9 took 122mm artillery fire at 1020, wounding five 
Marines. 3/9 also took 60mm mortar fire at 1815 and 2030 resulting in thirteen Marines 
wounded. American air and artillery accumulated a body count of five killed by artillery and two 
killed by air. The most significant action of the day was the engagement of the bulk of 1st 
Battalion as they crossed Phase Line Red late on the night of 11 February at 2200. The results 
were overwhelmingly in the Marines’ favor with twenty-five North Vietnamese killed to only 
two Marines killed and nine wounded. Well-coordinated and heavy artillery fire allowed the 
Marines to beat back the enemy forces that had massed just outside FSB Erskine past Phase Line 
Red. The consistent pattern of artillery and air support creating the most casualties continued.48  
Marine losses were high on 12 February, suffering one killed, but thirty-six wounded. 
Meanwhile, the units’ Close Air Support (CAS) killed sixteen North Vietnamese, while the 
Marine patrols failed to inflict significant damage upon the units they encountered. No count in a 
single engagement yielded higher than two NVA killed with the total for the day being nineteen, 
which included the discovery of eight graves in the count.49  
Between 13-16 February, fighting became ferocious, especially for 1/9 and 3/9. The 
Marines’ sweep southward encountered fierce resistance, but their advance was sustained by 
frequent use of supporting arms. On 13 February, C/1/9 encountered the stiffest resistance. The 
Marines made contact with a North Vietnamese platoon that was defending a hilltop with mortar 
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and machine gun support. This was one of few engagements during the three-day period that saw 
Marine riflemen inflicting significant casualties upon the North Vietnamese, rather than artillery 
or CAS. Company C assaulted the enemy position around 1425, suffering six Marine wounded 
and killing twelve North Vietnamese. Just before midnight, the enemy attempted to retake the 
hilltop the Marines seized earlier in the day. Company C repelled the assault at the cost of two 
Marines killed, fifteen wounded. The unit compiled twelve North Vietnamese killed. Artillery, 
however, still produced the most results over two days.50 The artillery and air reported thirty-five 
killed for 14 February alone. Artillery killed seven in several cumulative fire missions on 15 
February, and 16 February produced fourteen North Vietnamese killed by artillery and air 
support. The rifle companies of the 9th Marines struggled to fix and destroy the enemy, but 
supporting arms continued to produce high kill counts.51  
At 1800 on 16 February, the 24-hour truce for the Tet holiday went into effect. North 
Vietnamese forces betrayed the truce in the Dewey Canyon area. At 0405 the morning of 17 
February, FSB Cunningham was attacked from three sides. North Vietnamese sappers dressed in 
shorts and skull caps breached the defensive wire and ran toward the center of the fire support 
base while they tossed concussion grenades and satchel charges. The attack lasted nearly three 
hours. Once the attack was beaten back, the dead and wounded were counted: four Marines 
killed, thirty-eight wounded with thirty-seven North Vietnamese killed. The artillery atop 
Cunningham expended 3,270 rounds from 0430 to 0630 on areas of suspected enemy escape 
routes, columns, and assembly areas.52 There were thirty-two guns atop Cunningham, and 
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averaged twenty rounds per minute, which puts the rate of fire at just below one round per 
minute. This was considered sustained fire for a gun. This does not indicate an abnormally high 
firing rate, but maintaining a pace of a round a minute for two hours while receiving fire was not 
an easy task. It is notable, however, that firing in the attack on Cunningham was close to the 
4,054 round a day average fired in the fighting around Dak To in October 1967. The major 
difference was that Dak To was a thirty-seven day fight with seventy-seven guns deployed, while 
the battle for Cunningham was a two to three hour affair with only thirty-two guns.53 This 
comparison indicates that during the heaviest fighting in Dewey Canyon, the thirty-two guns at 
Cunningham almost matched the daily total for a larger operation such as Dak To in just two to 
three hours. Furthering the observation that there was more continuity between the 
Westmoreland and Abrams command eras than proponents of the strategy shift would like to 
admit.  
Throughout 18-20 February, heavy resistance continued. The Marines overran several 
positions of entrenched North Vietnamese hidden among thick vegetation nearby FSB Erskine. 
While clearing bunkers, the Marines killed 122 North Vietnamese, with seventy-one of those 
coming from napalm strikes within fifty meters of the Americans’ positions. In contrast, the 
Marines suffered only one killed with twelve wounded. As far as the additional artillery and air 
effect for the three days, the Marines killed twenty-seven more North Vietnamese. Artillery and 
air support allowed the Marines to suffer minimal casualties while encountering significant 
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amounts of entrenched North Vietnamese further emphasizing the importance of overwhelming 
firepower to the execution of the operation.  
By the end of the day on 20 February, 1st and 2nd Battalions found themselves near the 
Laotian border. Throughout the operation, the Marines had received sporadic, yet accurate 
artillery fire from across the border. Headquarters also worried about the security of the flanks of 
the units but also saw Laos as containing many targets of opportunity such as enemy artillery and 
supply routes.54 Companies E and H/2/9 arrived at a ridgeline that offered a view onto Route 922 
just inside Laos. Route 922 was a major enemy road allowing the movement of men and material 
into South Vietnam. Perched upon the ridgeline, Company H observed an enemy convoy moving 
down the route, provoking the Marines to lobby for an incursion into Laos.  
Discussion of an incursion into Laos had occurred as early as 2 February. Davis 
requested that Special Operations Group (SOG) activities expand into the Laotian panhandle, 
specifically, Base Area 611, an enemy sanctuary inside Laos. MACV approved the request. In 
addition to the expansion of SOG reconnaissance, Davis requested permission to allow the 9th 
Marines to enter Laos and destroy North Vietnamese artillery pieces that continually harassed 
the Marines early in Operation Dewey Canyon. MACV quickly denied this request due to 
limitations in the rules of engagement preventing large regular American units from entering 
neutral Laos. There was a loophole, however. American forces and their allies ‘could’ cross into 
Laos if they were engaged with enemy forces “as necessary for the preservation of the force.” 
They were also permitted to call in artillery and air strikes on targets in Laos. The Marines 
exploited these loopholes to justify their raid into Laos.55  
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With information provided by Winecoff’s H/2/9, SOG teams, and radio intercepts, the 
Marines observed the enemy utilizing Route 922 to move their artillery into safe havens in Laos 
away from the Marines sweeping through the area.  
This is where matters become murky. There are conflicting reports as to who authorized 
the incursion and who knew about it. The Marine Corps official history asserts that Army 
Lieutenant General Richard G. Stilwell, commander of XXVI Corps, reinitiated Davis’ request 
of 2 February, effectively authorizing the raid, whilst notifying Lieutenant General Robert E. 
Cushman, commander of III MAF and the senior ranking Marine officer in country that the raid 
was approved. Cushman then forwarded the request to Abrams, the MACV commander. The 
official history then asserts that Barrow did not wait for the permission of Abrams and simply 
sent a message to Winecoff at Company H, authorizing him to set up an ambush along Route 922 
inside of Laos, but also to reenter South Vietnam by 0630 the next morning.56 
Davis presented two conflicting stories in two different sources. In his career interview, 
Davis maintained that he was on R&R in Hong Kong and that the raid was authorized by 
Stilwell, thus affirming the official history’s interpretation.57 But, in his memoir, Davis wrote:  
The strongest vote of confidence received came from 
General Abrams himself. When apprised of the purpose of the 
ambush, Abe reversed his earlier position and authorized a full 
battalion of the 9th Marines to enter Laos for the purpose of 
destroying the threat posed by the 122s. Abe requested only that 
there be no public discussion of the foray across the border and 
informed American ambassador in Laos, William Sullivan, only 
after the operation was underway.”58  
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Davis’s second version of events suggests that the command did not originate with just 
Stilwell, but from the highest levels of leadership, thus providing some commentary on the war 
that Abrams wanted to wage during his tenure as MACV commander. A war that looked similar 
to Westmoreland’s, relying on search-and-destroy type operations that depended on supporting 
arms to generate enemy casualties. 
Cushman’s version of the events further confuses the situation. He remarked in his career 
interview when asked about the ambush, “No, nobody asked for permission. I’m glad they 
didn’t, I’d had to say no.”59 This directly contradicts the official history and Davis.  
Regardless of who authorized the raid, Winecoff received a coded message from 2/9 
headquarters ordering an ambush of convoys on Route 922 in Laos on the afternoon of 21 
February. By this point, Winecoff’s men were exhausted. He had reservations about his men 
carrying out the ambush with so little preparation, and requested a twenty-four-hour 
postponement order. Around 1400, 2nd Battalion command denied Winecoff’s request. Winecoff 
decided to utilize only his 1st and 2nd platoons in the ambush. By 1610, the 1st Platoon, 
company headquarters, a mortar team, and machine gun team were on their way to rendezvous 
with 2nd platoon, who had previously been on patrol.60 The command’s insistence Winecoff’s 
men carrying out the ambush suggests that there were no reserve units that could be brought in to 
reinforce the Marines. It also indicates that the Marines’ air mobility continued to be severely 
hampered by the remoteness of the area and a lack of helicopters. 
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After a thirty-minute forward reconnaissance, the ambush order was issued orally by the 
company commander and relayed to the men by their team leaders. As the sounds of gunfire 
from other firefights barked in the distance, the platoons traveled the final 900 meters to the 
ambush site, maintaining physical contact with the man in front of them due to the pitch 
blackness as they traveled through a creek bed, traversed a ridgeline, reached the road at 2030 
and then selected a specific kill zone. They were waiting on the Laotian side of the road so that 
their push through the ambush site would be back toward South Vietnam. Spotting a single 
soldier walking along the path, the Marines let him pass in hopes that more lucrative prey lay 
beyond. Around 0230, the Marines heard engines start in the distance. Ten anxious minutes later, 
the Marines spotted a convoy of eight trucks approaching their kill zone. After three trucks rolled 
past his position and the convoy stopped, Winecoff detonated a claymore initiating the ambush 
turning the second truck into an inferno with the chief scout firing a Light Anti-Tank Weapon 
(LAW) into the cabin of the truck soon after. The Marines poured fire into the trucks. In order to 
prevent any North Vietnamese soldiers from escaping and to protect themselves from any 
unknown forces, the Marines quickly called in artillery to bracket their position.61 After minutes 
of intense small arms fire, Winecoff called a halt to his men’s fire amidst ammunition from the 
second truck cooking off simultaneously. He gave the order to advance and check the ambush 
site. The two platoons then proceeded back the way they entered Laos and rejoined their 3rd 
platoon on the ridgeline they previously occupied overlooking the border. The ambush netted 
three trucks destroyed and ten North Vietnamese killed.62 Members of 2/9 dubbed it the “night of 
the sweaty palms.”63 
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 Later in the day, H/2/9 saw eight more North Vietnamese soldiers from their vantage 
point, called in artillery and killed two. Around the same time as the artillery strike, Abrams 
authorized the requests of Stilwell and Cushman to venture into Laos. Later, on 24 February, 
Abrams placed a restriction on discussion of the raid to the public. Barrow later utilized Abrams’ 
authorization to the fullest extent in a return to Laos later in the operation.64 
Winecoff’s ambush in Laos proved to be one of the few instances of clear success in the 
operation. Inside Laos, the North Vietnamese concentrated most of their forces and supplies, 
resulting in concrete results when the Marines finally crossed the border. Deviation from the 
original plan for Dewey Canyon and airmobile tactics produced tangible success. This suggests 
that the key to preventing North Vietnamese presence in I Corps lay not in areas such as the Da 








                                                          






Back inside South Vietnam, in the center of the regimental push, A/1/9 made heavy 
contact throughout 22 February. Company A, after reconnaissance of areas of action from 21 
February, proceeded to push down the AO, moving off the ridgeline they had previously 
occupied. After moving off the ridge, the company stopped to eat and refill their canteens. While 
a water detail was filling canteens for the Company, they received mortar fire with the sergeant 
leading the detail taking shrapnel in his face. A machine gun opened up on 1st Lieutenant 
Wesley Fox, commander of Company A, and his men, allowing him to locate the enemy 
positions. The Marines maneuvered through triple canopied jungles, intermingled with banana 
groves and underbrush until 1st Platoon encountered a reinforced North Vietnamese company 
entrenched in a bunker complex, complete with RPG and machine gun emplacements. Fox 
moved his 3rd platoon in line with the 1st and ordered his 2nd platoon to push through the gap 
between the 1st and 3rd platoons. The Marines’ assault stalled, and they began taking heavy 
casualties, since they were not supplemented at the time by air and artillery support due to the 
weather, terrain, and vegetation. Fox could not withdraw for fear that his Marines might be 
wiped out. As the units pressed forward, the command group received a direct hit by a mortar 
round killing some and wounding almost everyone including Fox, while his executive officer 
escaped unscathed. As the fighting continued, the weather lifted. Sunlight filled the jungle and 
revealed two OV-10 Broncos in the sky. Fox radioed the flight leader and called in an 
impromptu strike on the machinegun nest that had his Marines pinned down. The Broncos hit the 
position with cannon and rocket fire and “the gun went silent, forever.” Relief came in the form 
of D/1/9 who appeared through the banana groves in front of Company A. The Marines emerged 





Vietnamese.65 Fox was awarded the Medal of Honor for his leadership in the engagement. Once 
again, supporting arms proved decisive and allowed the Marines to win the day, even at a 
relatively high cost.  
 From 11 February to 23 February, the period of heaviest fighting, the artillery in support 
of the Marines fired approximately 5,000 rounds per day with a high of 6,187 rounds according 
to the artillery report. Additionally, the report notes that 63 percent of artillery fires were 
observed and fired on targets of opportunity.66 An average of 5,000 shells a day is not indicative 
of a force that is utilizing focused or limited firepower. This figure indicates that firepower was 
central to Dewey Canyon’s concept of operations and 9th Marines’ ability to inflict casualties 
upon its enemy. But examination of the fire mission logs in the 2/12 command chronology reveal 
an average of 866 shells fired per day between 11 and 23 February, not the 5,000 suggested by 
the artillery report. Considering that each logged mission has a callsign for an aerial observer, it 
is safe to assume all the logged fire missions were observed fire. This suggests that the missing 
missions were most likely unobserved. If that is true, then, the percentage of observed fire for the 
period of heaviest fighting for Dewey Canyon is only 17 percent with 83 percent being 
unobserved fire. An astounding rate for an operation considering unobserved fire was, on 
average, 10 percent of all ammunition fired in Vietnam from just after Abrams took command 
until June 1970 when the practice became virtually nonexistent.67 It is entirely possible, upon 
further examination that other operations during this period may misrepresent the amount of 
firepower used. It may also yield evidence for how much unobserved fire was utilized as well. 
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Dependence on unobserved fire suggests a continuity between operations during the 
Westmoreland era rather than a sudden shift to more focused artillery fire under Abrams.  
Despite the heaviest fighting being over, H, E, and F/2/9 spent the next three days inside 
Laos. Sweeping east on Route 922, the Marines blocked any traffic back toward the South 
Vietnamese border, captured twenty tons of food and ammunition, two 122mm and killed forty-
eight North Vietnamese along the way. Notably, one Marine, Corporal William D. Morgan, 
posthumously earned the Medal of Honor by charging into the open, drawing fire from an enemy 
bunker, and allowing for two wounded Marines to be saved by his squad. Supporting arms 
contributed significantly throughout the search-and-destroy mission into Laos. The Marines 
reported thirty-eight North Vietnamese soldiers killed by artillery during the three-day sweep 
with an additional six killed by air.68 Supporting arms contributed at least forty-four North 
Vietnamese killed during the three days, though it is unclear how many of these forty-four were 
killed inside Laos. 
On 1 March, the companies were within 1,000 meters of South Vietnam and were lifted 
back to Vandegrift Combat Base on 3 March, ending Operation Dewey Canyon for them.69 Once 
again, impromptu operations inside Laos proved most fruitful, especially late in the action when 
the North Vietnamese seem to have decided to abandon the base area inside South Vietnam and 
take refuge across the border. At this stage, the 9th Marines’ objectives were considered largely 
accomplished, effectively ending Phase III with retraction being the next step.70  
                                                          
68 AAR 1/9, 22-23; AAR 9th Marines, 22-23; Smith, High Mobility and Standdown, 47.   
69 Ibid, 47; Melson, “Dewey Canyon,” 8.  





A retraction was ordered, but it proved to be difficult. Originally the operation was 
supposed to end with a leapfrogging retraction that depended heavily on artillery protection. The 
problem with this concept by the time the Marines were ready to leave the area was it required 
many different displacements and heavy lifts, thus requiring helicopters. These helicopters could 
not be obtained, however, because of shortages and the bad weather that had repeatedly been a 
problem throughout the operation.71  
After 2/9’s lift back to Vandegrift on 3 March, the weather went from bad to worse and 
the remaining elements of 9th Marines had the additional mission of extracting the SOG teams 
that were working in Laos. The Marines also discovered more weapons and ammunitions caches 
in the eastern portion of the area of operations.72 On 8 March, 1st Battalion moved toward Tam 
Boi. The same day, F/2/12 abandoned FSB Erskine, displacing to Ca Lu and 1st Provisional 
Battery moving to Vandegrift. After 5 days of weather-related difficulties, Mortar Battery, the 
majority of 3/9, and all artillery closed FSB Cunningham. The 1st Battalion’s lift started at 1120 
on 18 March after finally linking up with the SOG teams from Laos concluding at 1630.  
Operation Dewey Canyon terminated at 1820 on the 18 February, ending a long run for 
the Marines in the Da Krong Valley. The two-month sweep resulted in 130 Marines killed and 
920 wounded. The Marines claimed to have killed 1,617 North Vietnamese killed but took only 
five prisoners. The equipment captured was fairly substantial: 1,223 individual weapons, 
607,874 rounds of small arms ammunition, twelve 122mm guns, eighty-six anti-aircraft guns, 
barrels, or mounts and tripods. As far as perishable supplies, 220,800 pounds of rice and sixty-
seven live chickens were seized amongst many other things.73 Notably, the number of weapons 
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captured measured almost 400 less than the body count for the operation, suggesting the 
possibility that aerial observers could not account for the weapons of all the artillery strikes or 



















IMPLICATIONS OF OPERATION DEWEY CANYON 
As far as the success of Operation Dewey Canyon within the context of the whole war, 
those who argue the campaign prevented the traditional spring offensive by the North 
Vietnamese appear mistaken. The action merely postponed it. The North Vietnamese returned to 
the region after the brief incursions of the Americans and ARVN, in fact, the U.S. Army returned 
to the area in June 1969 for Operation Apache Snow, with its most significant action being the 
Battle for Hamburger Hill. The fact is that the North Vietnamese were able to return to the area 
soon after Dewey Canyon because no American or South Vietnamese forces attempted to occupy 
the Dewey Canyon AO which was claimed to be crucial to the security of the A Shau Valley and 
I Corps itself.  
The Marine Corps has since utilized Dewey Canyon in the education of their officers. 
The lessons based on Dewey Canyon, however, derive their wisdom from a biased interpretation 
of the operation’s success. The lesson plan for a course taught at the Amphibious Warfare School 
admits that the tactics implemented were from the army, specifically the 1st Cavalry Division. It 
goes on to praise Dewey Canyon as an “overland” assault, not a mobile operation like the ones 
envisioned by Davis.74 The fact that Dewey Canyon was to be an overland operation did not 
result from keen planning, but was borne out of necessity and poor prediction about weather 
conditions.  
The lessons also praised the role of intelligence in the success of Dewey Canyon, but 
intelligence was poor prior to and throughout the operation. Much of the praise of intelligence 
could only be the product of hindsight. In reality, Marine Corps intelligence had no estimate of 
                                                          






the size of the enemy presence in the Da Krong Valley or their specific location.75 Intelligence 
was gathered during the operation, placing the Marines in the Da Krong Valley in a precarious 
situation. Fire support was meant to remedy the Marines’ situation and save them from disaster. 
Its absence, such as the Company G’s ambush on Co Ka Leuye, proved deadly for the Marines.  
The number of North Vietnamese killed and the total of equipment captured gained 
Dewey Canyon a significant place in Marine Corps history, but what does Dewey Canyon tell us 
about the conduct of the Vietnam War and ongoing debates regarding strategy? Though 
Operation Dewey Canyon was a single operation occurring in 1969, it has implications regarding 
the overall conduct of the war and the historiographical debates surrounding the strategy of the 
Vietnam War. As noted in the introduction, several historians have posited that there was a 
drastic shift in strategy and tactics from the tenure of MACV commander Westmoreland to that 
of Abrams. The alleged shift relies on an emphasis on counterinsurgency and pacification 
operations rather than search-and-destroy operations and reduced use of firepower.  
  As this article has revealed, several aspects of Dewey Canyon suggest there was no shift 
in strategy. First, it is instructive that Davis and other high-ranking Marine officers received no 
indication of a change in strategy or felt that anything was different when Abrams arrived. Davis 
claims that his new approach had the full approval of Abrams and that while flying over South 
Vietnam together at one point remarked, “General, don’t you worry. We’re not going to let them 
shit on us anymore.”76 His statement is indicative of his support for Davis’ aggressive, search-
and-destroy approach. III MAF Commander Cushman also did not think that there was a change 
at all in overall strategy between Westmoreland and Abrams. He expressed, “I don’t recall any 
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great change with Abrams taking over. He had a much different style, but he also was 
aggressive. He also wanted offensive operations and there weren’t any changes in the 
philosophy, as I recall. We never got into calling our operations “search and destroy” very 
much…We went after the enemy where we could find him.” 77 Cushman’s statement is perhaps 
the most revealing. It directly supports Daddis’ claims that the supposed shift was simply a 
change in rhetoric. Not using the term search-and-destroy prevented any controversy about 
continuity between Westmoreland and Abrams, but it was simply the same tactics by another 
name. Cushman was also familiar with both Westmoreland and Abrams and would have noted a 
dramatic shift in their approaches.  
A thorough study of Operation Dewey Canyon indicates that Daddis and Birtle are 
correct in their arguments. The conduct of Dewey Canyon and its foundational concepts show a 
continuity in strategy between Westmoreland and Abrams. The official Marine Corps History for 
1968 acknowledges, “Davis had become impressed with the airmobile tactics of the 1st Air 
Cavalry Division during Operation Pegasus. As one Army officer remembered, the senior 
members of Rosson’s Prov Corps staff would ‘take turns having dinner with him every night in 
the headquarters mess, giving him our ideas on mobile warfare, and during the day we flew 
around with him.””78 Davis simply adopted the same approach that the army had been exercising 
for years at that point. Though it may have been a new approach for the 3rd Marine Division, the 
use of these tactics were not new in the broader context of the war and perpetuated the same style 
of operations that had been conducted during the Westmoreland era.  
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The firebase concept that provided the 9th Marines with overwhelming fire support was 
also not an innovation by either Davis or the Marine Corps. According to Barrow, “We did not 
conceive the fire support base concept. As a matter of fact, the Army did.”79 The tactics utilized 
during Operation Dewey Canyon were airmobile, search-and-destroy concepts, and firebase 
concepts were adapted from the army. Examination of Army and Marine Corps operations 
during this time period may show similar trends, further suggesting that tactics remained 
constant between Westmoreland and Abrams’ commands and pacification had not been given 
priority over conventional operations designed to find, fix, and kill the enemy.  
 A further continuity with earlier military methods is that the firebase concept remained 
central to the operation from planning until its end. Additionally, the largest amounts of 
casualties during the action stemmed from artillery and CAS, not from firefights between the 
Marines and North Vietnamese. Furthermore, the command chronology and artillery report for 
2/12 indicate that the number of shells fired in an operation quite possibly could be doctored. 
Whether the statistic of 5,000 rounds a day during the heaviest period of fighting and 63 percent 
observed fire is true or not, the statistics point toward the possibility that firepower did not 
become focused during Abrams’ command. In fact, if the statistic of 17 percent observed fire 
during the heaviest period of fighting is true, it certainly suggests that the overall reduction in 
unobserved fire may be based upon false reports, further indicating continuity between 
Westmoreland and Abrams.  
 
 
                                                          






In sum, the approach taken by the Marines in Operation Dewey Canyon suggests 
continuity of tactics and firepower use during Abrams’ tenure as MACV commander. It also 
indicates that many of the lessons taught by the Marine Corps about Dewey Canyon are suspect, 
built upon misinterpretation of the operation.  Dewey Canyon was conceived as a search-and-
destroy operation, meant to clear the jungles of the Da Krong Valley of North Vietnamese 
soldiers. Throughout the action, the Marines utilized firepower as their main tool to inflict 
casualties upon the enemy, similar to its use during the Westmoreland era. These findings 
support arguments made by Daddis and Birtle that the proclaimed shift in strategy between 
Westmoreland and Abrams never occurred. Further investigation into later operations after 
Abrams took command of MACV may reach similar conclusions. Examinations of other 
operations during Abrams’ command are essential going forward for understanding the 
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